EVER BETTER SITUATIONS AND THE FAILURE
OF EXPRESSION PRINCIPLES
Dean Zimmerman

William Rowe argues that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were faced with
an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that being could not
also be unsurpassably morally excellent. His argument assumes that, at least
in ideal circumstances, degree of moral goodness must be perfectly expressed
in the degree of goodness of the outcomes chosen. Reflection upon the application of analogous expression principles for certainty and desire shows that
such principles can be expected to fail for anyone capable of facing an infinite
range of options.

Rowe’s Argument
William Rowe has argued that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were
faced with an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that
being could not also be unsurpassably morally excellent.1 The argument
relies crucially upon Rowe’s principle B.
B: If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it
could have created, then it is possible that there exist a being morally
better than it.2

This is backed up by the intuitive thought that: in general, someone willing
to settle for a less good outcome, other things being equal, is morally inferior to someone who has higher standards.3
Here is my reconstruction of Rowe’s argument:
1.

For any x and W: if x is all-powerful and all-knowing in W, and
there is no maximum to the goodness of the worlds available to x,
then x could have ensured the existence of a better world than W.

1
Rowe, “The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom,” “The Problem of No Best
World,” and “Can God Be Free?”; the fullest presentation is in Rowe, Can God Be Free?, Ch.
6. The core argument was also stated succinctly in a one-page 1988 article by Stephen Grover
(“Why Only the Best is Good Enough”).
2
Rowe, Can God Be Free?, 91.
3
Rowe, Can God Be Free?, 100–101.
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2.

For any x and W: if x, in W, could have ensured the existence of a
better world than W, then W is a possible world in which x is not as
good as x could have been. [Implication of Rowe’s Principle B]

3.

So, for any x and W: if x is all-powerful and all-knowing in W, and
there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds, then W is a world
in which x is not as good as x could have been. [From 1 & 2]

4.

There is no possible world W in which God exists but is not as good
as God is in some other world W*—nor is there any world in which
any other being is better than God is in W. [Moral Unsurpassability]

5.

So, for any W: if there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds,
then, if God exists in W, God is not all-powerful and all-knowing in
W. [From 3 & 4]

6.

There is no possible world in which God exists but is not all-powerful
and all-knowing. [Essentiality of Omnipotence and Omniscience]
So, for any W: if there is no maximum to the goodness of worlds,
then God does not exist in W. [From 5 & 6]

Which is to say, if there is no maximum to the goodness of creatable
worlds, God is impossible.
The argument has elicited a wide range of responses; but it is fair to say
that most critics take issue with B, denying it for one reason or another.
Principle B is a kind of “expression principle”4—it links a psychological
state or character trait that comes in degrees, on the one hand, with its
expression in behavior under idealized circumstances, on the other hand.
Most critics of Rowe’s argument claim that, when faced with an endless
sequence of better and better options, choosing a worse world than one
could is compatible with moral unsurpassability. When circumstances
present ever better options from which to choose (what Chris Tucker calls
an “Ever Better Situation”5), the value of one’s choice will not precisely
express the goodness of one’s motives or character.6
This criticism of B will seem intuitive to those already convinced, by
similar examples, of the appropriateness of “satisficing”—choosing a
good enough option when one could do better. Michael Slote famously
argues for a “Satisficing Consequentialism” partly on this basis. He first
points out that rationality seems not to be impugned by choosing a good
enough option from an endless series of better and better options:
Compare Morris’s use of the term “Expression Thesis” (“Perfection and Creation,” 242).
Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
6
Representatives include Morris, “Perfection and Creation,” 243–245; Howard-Snyder
and Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World” and
“The Real Problem of No Best World”; Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 171–
173; and Langtry, God, the Best, and Evil, ch. 2. Norman Kretzmann foresaw Rowe’s argument,
and made the same move (Kretzmann, “A Particular Problem of Creation,” 238). A different
sort of challenge to principle B has been developed by Brian Leftow. He argues that even God
4
5
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How do we react to fairy tales in which the hero or heroine, offered a single wish, asks for a pot of gold, for a million (1900) dollars, or simply, for
(enough money to enable) his family and himself to be comfortably well off
for the rest of their lives? In each case the person asks for less than he might
have asked for, but we are not typically struck by the thought that he was
irrational to ask for less than he could have.7

Slote then draws a similar conclusion about the moral status of someone
forced to choose among options that benefit others to higher and higher
degrees, without limit:
[C]onsider a fairy-tale wish regarding people other than oneself. A warrior
has fought meritoriously and died in a good cause, and the gods wish to
grant him a single wish for those he leaves behind, before he enters Paradise
and ceases to be concerned with his previous life. Presented with such an
opportunity, may not the warrior wish for his family to be comfortably well
off forever after? And will we from a common-sense standpoint consider
him to have acted wrongly or non-benevolently towards his family because
he (presumably knowingly) rejected an expectably better lot for them in favor of what was simply good enough? Surely not.8

As Chris Tucker has pointed out, Slote’s reaction is widely shared;
satisficing in Ever Better Situations has seemed highly intuitive to many
moral philosophers—so intuitive as to be “banal,” and hardly worthy of
the name “satisficing.”9 According to Tucker, it should rather be thought
of as a kind of “motivated submaximization”—a situation in which, while
aiming at as much good as possible, one settles for less than one could
because of “countervailing considerations.”10 Tucker argues that theists
who reject B are merely committed “to the appropriateness of motivated
submaximization,” which comes at little cost since it is “so popular and
well supported in the mainstream literature.”11
I agree with Tucker and the rest of the critics of B, and will attempt to
bolster confidence by telling a couple of stories. The stories raise problems for analogous expression principles that might be thought to govern
other personal characteristics besides moral goodness, benevolence,
or purity of motivation. These morally charged character traits come in
degrees because they depend upon psychological dispositions that also
come in degrees—e.g., some people are more willing to make personal
sacrifices for the sake of others in need, and qualify as more benevolent
in virtue of that fact. The hypothesis that moral perfection is a coherent
might be subject to moral luck, and wind up with a less good world for reasons that do not
impugn God’s character (I say “largely,” because the argument includes several dilemmas,
and not all the horns ascribe moral luck to God); see Leftow, “No Best World: Moral Luck”
and “No Best World: Creaturely Freedom.”
7
Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” 147.
8
Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” 150–151.
9
Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
10
Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130.
11
Tucker, “Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 138.
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notion depends upon the idea that there is at least one combination of
these psychological dispositions that makes for maximal moral goodness.
But should we expect these kinds of gradable psychological traits to be
capable of full expression, even in ideal circumstances, when there are infinitely many better and better options available to an agent, with no best?
Reflection upon a couple of other gradable psychological states strongly
suggests a negative answer. Certainty and desire come in degrees, and
they may well have upper limits—at least, there may be highest degrees of
certainty or desire available to creatures like us. We naturally expect that,
in ideal circumstances, different degrees of certainty and desire would be
expressed in different kinds of behavior. But when agents are supposed
to be capable of contemplating infinitely many acts, or even indefinitely
many acts, B-like principles for the expression of certainty and desire lead
to analogues of Rowe’s argument. The results are highly counterintuitive,
and this supports the general claim that simple expression principles, like
B, should be expected to fail in cases relevantly like an Ever Better Situation.
Expression Principle for Certainty
I begin with the failure of an expression principle for certainty—a principle that seems very plausible, until one considers the infinite case.
In general, the amount of money one is willing to bet reflects one’s certainty about the outcome. If an ideal gambler is in ideal circumstances—she
is clear-headed, not making any mathematical or logical mistakes, acting
entirely out of self-interest—her willingness to risk larger and larger sums
should be expected to go up with her degree of certainty. So this expression principle about idealized gamblers seems, prima facie, reasonable:
B*: If an ideal gambler in ideal circumstances bets n dollars on a given
outcome, but could have bet more than n dollars, then it is possible
for the gambler to be more certain about that outcome.
Suppose there is a cosmic lender, Donna, who has convinced an ideal
gambler, John, that, for any sum of money he can think of, she will give
him that much money to bet on the outcome of a game. Donna plays
the role of “The Lender,” a role that requires convincing any reasonable
person that you have any amount of money the person can name.
Now suppose the game is this: there is a mathematically challenged
rich man, Donald, whom the gambler believes to be as rich as Donna; and
Donald bets John that 2 + 2 = 5. John is absolutely certain, as certain as it is
possible for John to be of anything, that Donald is wrong about this. John
has several thousand dollars to bet, but—because the situation is an ideal
one, in which John is purely self-interested, and there are no other relevant
considerations—John would bet anything he can get his hands on that
Donald is wrong. However, Donna, the Lender, is nowhere to be found.
So John bets Donald $1000 that 2 + 2 is not 5. Donald says, “That’s not very
much. Let’s make this bet interesting; for any amount of money you can
name, I’ll bet you that much money that I’m right and you’re wrong.”
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Suddenly, Donna enters the room, and offers to cover John’s bet. John,
relieved, chooses the first astronomical amount he can think of—three
hundred billion dollars—although John could easily have chosen a larger
number. While selecting this number, John does not lose any confidence
in his knowledge of mathematical facts; he knows he must choose some
amount, and that his choice will have to be to some degree arbitrary—not
correlated precisely with his rational expectations. John wins the bet, and
becomes fabulously wealthy.
If B* is true, there is a deep incoherence in this story, one that can be
revealed by an argument that mirrors Rowe’s:
1*. For any x and W: if x is an ideal gambler in W and x borrows n dollars from the Lender to bet on an outcome, then x could have bet
more on that outcome—for example, x could have asked for n + 1
dollars.
2*. For any x and W: if x, in W, is an ideal gambler who could have bet
more on an outcome, then W is a possible world in which x is not
as certain of the outcome as x could have been. [B*]
3*. So, for any x and W: if x is an ideal gambler in W and x borrows n
dollars from the Lender to bet on an outcome; then W is a world in
which x is not as certain of the outcome as x could have been. [1* &
2*]
4*. In W* (the world of this story), John is an ideal gambler who is as
certain of the outcome as he could be of anything—there is no possible world in which John is more certain about something.
5*. So, for any W: if W is a world in which John borrows n dollars from
the Lender to bet on a certain outcome, then John is not absolutely
certain that the outcome will occur (John is not as certain as he is in
W*). [From 3* & 4*]
6*. But W* is a world in which John borrows n dollars from the Lender
to bet on a certain outcome (that is part of the story).
CONTRADICTION: In W*, John is not as certain about the outcome as John is in W*.
What this argument shows is that, if B* is true, the conclusion of the story
about John, Donald, and the Lender was deeply incoherent. Once Donna
offered to cover John’s bet, the story could only be continued in one way,
so long as John remains an ideal gambler in ideal circumstances (that is,
John does not become confused or distracted, and John does not cease
to be purely self-interested): “John’s absolute certainty about the simplest
mathematical facts faded away in the presence of the Lender.” But there
seems nothing inconsistent in finishing the story with John’s making an
arbitrary choice, and denying that John’s certainty changes.
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Slote’s first fairy-tale moral seems exactly right: When it is better to
choose arbitrarily among excellent options rather than not to choose at all,
the rational person will choose arbitrarily. There might be some amounts
that it would be positively crazy for John to choose, and some that are borderline; but as long as there are many that are perfectly excellent, choosing
one when a better is available is consistent with John’s being an ideal gambler—he is not making any mathematical or logical errors, he is driven
only by self-interest.12 And the kind of information gained when Donna
enters the room, which has nothing to do with whether two and two make
five, should have no effect upon John’s level of certainty.
Surely the better thing to say is that 2* and its justification, B*, the
certainty analogue of B, should not be expected to hold when a gambler
has infinitely (really, in this case, indefinitely) many options from which
to choose, and no best option. When confronted by infinitely many (or
indefinitely many) choices of a sort that normally can be counted upon
to precisely reflect or express an agent’s level of certainty, one should no
longer expect the choice to express the agent’s certainty.
Expression Principle for Desire
Here is a similar case in which a different sort of mental state—degree of
desire to reach some place—might be expected to be expressed by a different kind of action—the speed with which one travels. On the face of it,
an analogue expression principle is plausible (once the case is set up just
right): degree of desire should, other things being equal, be expressed in
the speed with which one satisfies the desire. But, in the infinite or indefinite case, one should no longer expect the relevant expression principle
to hold.
Suppose that an ideal traveler—someone who only cares about the time
it takes to get to her destination, and who makes no logical mistakes in
her practical reasoning—wants to reach New York quickly, and wants this
as much as she could want anything. Since she wants nothing else that
could conflict with this desire, she will use the fastest method, and spare
no expense. Someone who claims to be in this situation, but who takes the
Queen Elizabeth or makes a stopover in Boston to see relatives, does not
12
Tucker cites several affirmations of the rationality of this sort of “first pass satisficing”
(i.e., the rationality, in Ever Better Situations, of choosing an arbitrary but highly prized outcome), including Pollock, “How Do You Maximize Expectation Value?,” 417–418; Schmidtz,
“Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy,” 41–44; and Slote, Beyond Optimizing, 110–123
(“Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization,” 130). I would add that even James Dreier,
who explicitly argues against the idea that the norms of rationality permit satisficing (“Why
Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t”), would allow that John’s
choosing an arbitrary amount to bet is more rational than John’s not betting at all. Dreier is
inclined to say that John faces a rational dilemma: whatever John bets, he can be faulted from
the standpoint of practical reason; he is not perfectly rational (personal communication). As
Daniel Rubio has pointed out to me, this conclusion does not save an expression principle
such as (B*), which is not about whether satisficing in Ever Better Situations is compatible
with being certain and being perfect rational, but rather whether it is compatible with being
certain and being entirely self-interested and logically infallible.
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after all have this maximal desire to get to New York quickly, or else she is
not an ideal traveler. This suggests an expression principle:
B**: If an ideal traveler is willing to settle for a trip to her goal at a certain number of meters-per-second, but could have chosen a faster
speed, then it is possible for her to have a stronger desire to reach
her goal.
Now take someone who really does have this extreme desire, someone
who desires to reach a loved one in New York City as much as she could
want anything; and convince her that the following is true:
Our scientists have created a teletransporter that cannot get you to New
York at the speed of light, but it can get you there at any speed you
choose short of that. The speed of light in a vacuum is 299,792,458 meters per second. You can choose 299,792,457 meters and 9 decimeters per
second, or 299,792,457 meters and 99 centimeters, or 299,792,457 meters
and 999 millimeters or. . . . Now tell us how fast you want to get there.
Of course normal people will think that such tiny differences in speed
could never matter to them or their loved ones, since the differences could
never be noticed by themselves or their friends in New York. But if our
idealized agent believes, rightly or wrongly, that any fraction of a second
could be detected by the person she is trying to reach, and that every fraction of a second apart is a sad one for that person, then “it doesn’t matter”
is not an option. For any “.999999 . . . ” chosen, something faster could
have been chosen.
Obviously, a parallel argument could be constructed that would show
the incoherence of our ideal agent retaining her degree of desire when
forced to choose an arbitrary but extremely high speed. (Constructing
the argument is left as the proverbial exercise for the reader.) The result
seems as unsatisfactory as in the case of certainty. Would the fact that she is
confronted with this kind of choice necessarily alter her mental states, rendering her either less anxious to get to New York or else causing her to make
some kind of serious mistake in her practical reasoning?13 The first option
does not seem psychologically inevitable; and the second option seems to
be an overly harsh judgment. So the expression principle B**, which seems
safe enough in the finite case, should not be expected to remain true when
an agent believes she is confronted with an Ever Better Situation.
Conclusions
The engine behind Rowe’s argument is principle B, an expression principle. And reflection upon the application of expression principles to
13
As in the parallel argument about certainty, some will say that the traveler in this Ever
Better Situation is being perfectly rational, so long as she chooses a speed that is fast enough.
Others will say that, although it would be positively irrational to choose not to go at all
(so it is rationally required to choose some speed or other), nevertheless, whatever speed is
chosen, the ideal traveler is open to some kind of rational criticism. (See n. 12 above.)
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beings facing an infinite (or indefinite) range of options strongly suggests
their invalidity in such cases. The possibility of a maximum of some psychological characteristic—certainty, desire, moral goodness, love; or, for
that matter, uncertainty, distaste, moral turpitude, hatred—should not be
undermined by the possibility of circumstances arising in which the degree of the characteristic cannot be fully expressed. If some such virtues,
vices, and attitudes admit of highest possible degrees (even if that maximum is relative to a kind of creature), it should be possible for an agent
to have the highest degree, face an infinite (or indefinite) range of options,
and choose one that does not perfectly reflect the character or attitude of
the agent.14
Rutgers University
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